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State Policy Dynamics in Evolutionary Games
Ilaria Brunetti · Yezekael Hayel · Eitan
Altman
Abstract Standard Evolutionary Game Theory framework is a useful tool
to study large interacting systems and to understand the strategic behavior
of individuals in such complex systems. Adding an individual state to model
local feature of each player in this context, allows one to study a wider range
of problems in various application areas as networking, biology, etc. In this
paper, we introduce such an extension of evolutionary game framework and
particularly, we focus on the dynamical aspects of this system. Precisely, we
study the coupled dynamics of the policies and the individual states inside a
population of interacting individuals. We first define a general model by cou-
pling replicator dynamics and continuous-time Markov Decision Processes and
we then consider a particular case of a two policies and two states evolutionary
game. We first obtain a system of combined dynamics and we show that the
rest-points of this system are equilibria profiles of our evolutionary game with
individual state dynamics. Second, by assuming two different time scales be-
tween states and policies dynamics, we can compute explicitly the equilibria.
Then, by transforming our evolutionary game with individual states into a
standard evolutionary game, we obtain an equilibrium profile which is equiv-
alent, in terms of occupation measures and expected fitness to the previous
one. All our results are illustrated with numerical analysis.
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1 Introduction
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) has been first introduced by J.Maynard
Smith [1] to model the evolution of species in biology. It makes use of Game
Theory tools to describe the dynamics of populations sizes as a result of a com-
petition between them, where players are repeatedly and randomly matched
through pairwise interactions. While in classical GT players are supposed to
be rational individuals which interact and choose their strategies in order to
maximize the individual fitness function, in EGT there is no rationality as-
sumption. All players in a population are supposed to use some action (or
behavior type) and the utility is interpreted as a Darwinian fitness depend-
ing on the behavior of others and thus on the population’s profile, i.e. on the
frequencies of the strategies in the whole population. Strategies with higher
fitness are supposed to spread within the population.
A key notion in EGT is the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS), which is
an action such that, if adopted by all the players, is robust against deviations
of a (possibly small) fraction of the population. From a biological point of view
it can be seen as a generalization of Darwin’s idea of survival of the fittest,
while from a GT perspective it is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium, which
satisfies a stability property. In order to explain how a population reaches a
stable situation, one needs to introduce another fundamental concept of EGT,
the replicator dynamics, which serves to highlight the role of selection from
a dynamic perspective. It is formalized by a system of ordinary differential
equations and it establishes that the evolution of the size of the populations
depends on the fitness they get in interactions. An action will spread if its
fitness is larger than the fitness averaged over the various strategies used in the
whole population. The folk theorem of evolutionary games allows to establish
a strict connection between the stable points of the Replicator Dynamics and
Nash Equilibria [2].
Evolutionary game dynamics are important foundations for understanding
behavior of individuals’ strategies in a population game. One main feature of
population dynamics, is the relationship with learning algorithms in games.
For example, in [3], the authors analyze a simple reinforcement learning model
(the ”Cross’ model”) discussing its relationship to the replicator dynamics (in
fact, their learning model converges to the asymmetric, continuous time ver-
sion of the replicator dynamics) and propose a discussion on why this learning
process is suitable for economic agents. In [4], the author examines the con-
vergence of fitness and strategies in Erev and Roth’s model of reinforcement
learning. This learning mechanism is one of the most simple as each individual
needs only his own fitness to update his action. Also for this learning procedure,
the author shows that its long-run behavior is governed by equations related
to Maynard Smith’s version of the replicator dynamic. A learning procedure
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describes how each individual adapts his action based on several information
like his own fitness, average fitness, historical actions of the others, proba-
bilistic beliefs on the other actions, etc. This question of level of information
under learning processes in games is widely studied and deeply analyzed in [5].
Many different learning algorithms/dynamics are proposed in the literature,
like Brown-Nash-Von Neumann, Logistic dynamics, etc. All these dynamics
can be generalized to the notion of revision protocols which define a general
rule (compare and innovate, target and innovate, compare and non-innovate,
etc) followed by individuals [6]. Then, depending on the rule, we get one of
the well-known dynamics. There are two main observations that motivate our
paper’s analysis: first, the population dynamics are usually studied for sta-
bility purposes of the equilibrium. In this paper, we consider the dynamics
from a control perspective. Second, taking into account individual local dy-
namics, intrinsically related to the global strategies dynamics, to the best of
our knowledge, has never been studied from our point of view: mixing Markov
Decision Process (MDP) and Evolutionary Dynamics. Note that similar game
theoretic frameworks have been proposed in [7] and [8] but they do not study
the dynamical aspects of the strategies of the game. In [9], the authors consider
an evolutionary stochastic game framework by assuming each player is play-
ing a best-response to the induced stationary population strategy. Then, the
authors introduce the replicator dynamics into their context. We show in our
paper, that we can reach such game against the stationary population state
by considering a two time scale behavior. Considering different velocities in
controlling dynamical systems is a common assumption in automatic control
application like robotic control in [10]. Moreover, Evolutionary game dynam-
ics has been proposed in [11] in order to introduce novel extremum seeking
controllers. The analysis of the dynamical system is based on the singular per-
turbation method. The authors consider coupled state-action dynamics but
their multi-population model differs largely from ours in several points. First,
they consider a multi-population model in which all agents of the same pop-
ulation maximize their common cost function. Second, the agent dynamics is
based on an extremum seeking dynamics as the cost functions of each pop-
ulation are unknown. Finally, the authors consider a singular perturbation
method assuming that the speed of state dynamics is negligible compared to
that of the decision dynamics, which is the opposite point of view of our model.
We introduce in this paper a particular population game in which each
individual controls a Continuous Time Markov Decision Process (CT-MDP).
This mathematical framework consisting in mixing CT-MDP and evolution-
ary games, yields interesting insights related to the dynamics of this complex
system with several decision makers in interaction. Indeed, the replicator dy-
namics becomes naturally coupled to the Markov dynamics of each individual.
In this context, we define the equilibrium population profile and study the
properties of the rest-points of these coupled state policy dynamics.
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1.1 Motivations and applications
The scenario proposed in this paper finds its first motivation in the study
of optimal power control policies in wireless networks [12]. MDP is a suitable
mathematical structure to study optimal problems in stochastic environment.
When considering interactions between several decision makers, competitive
MDP and stochastic games are useful tools. Our framework aims to enlarge
this family of models, by considering evolutionary perspective in the game
and then creating a link with dynamical systems. In fact, evolutionary games
can be interpreted as a dynamical system through the Replicator Dynamics
equations. Thus, since previous works only analyzed the evolutionary stability
concept, we propose in this paper a study of the dynamical aspect of this
framework. The usefulness of the paper is related to the applications that
can be studied based on it. In Information and Communications Technology,
our framework finds many application domains like social networks, crowd
sourcing and Internet of Things (IoT). For example, emerging applications in
engineering such as crowd-sourcing and (mis)information propagation involve
a large population of heterogeneous users or agents in a complex network who
strategically make dynamic decisions. These agents interact with each other
in a complex environment, in which each agent makes strategic and dynamic
decisions in response to the agents it interacts with. In all these applications,
the action set of each agent depends on a local state. For example, in social
networks, each agent may decide to add/remove friends/news based on his
own current status. His decision impacts his own status dynamics but also the
interaction with other agents. In IoT, a sensor has to determine when to upload
his information to the fusion center. This decision impacts his battery level but
also the communication quality as collisions may occur for example. As pointed
out in several references cited above, the Replicator Dynamics equations are
related to several learning algorithms that can be implemented in such sensors
or actuators in IoT. Then, by studying these equations, we can understand the
convergence behaviour of decentralized algorithms that can be used in such
applications. Finally, we would like to mention that our framework is totally
coherent with the ideas developed in [13], quoting: From an engineering point
of view, one of the main benefits of multi-agent learning (highly linked to the
Evolutionary dynamics like the RD) is its potential applicability as a design
methodology for distributed control, which is a branch of control theory that
deals with design and analysis of multiple controllers that operate together to
satisfy certain design requirements.
1.2 Contributions of the paper
We first introduce a general framework, in which we associate a state to
each player, and we suppose that this state determines the set of available
actions. We consider deterministic stationary policies and we suppose that
the choice of a policy determines the fitness of the player and it impacts the
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evolution of the state. We define the interdependent dynamics of states and
policies and we introduce the State Policy coupled Dynamics (SPcD). We then
analyze a particular simple case in order to solve the system and we establish
the relation between the equilibria of our system of differential equations and
the equilibria of the game. We assume that the processes of states and policies
move with different velocities: this assumption allows us to solve the system
and then to find the equilibria of our game with two different methods: the
singular perturbation method and a matrix approach. The main contributions
of this paper are listed below.
– We propose a rigorous model of population policies dynamics that takes
into account the individual state dynamics.
– We give some general results about the convergence of the coupled dynam-
ical system to an equilibrium of the population game.
– In a particular setting of population game, we give a deep analysis of the
convergence of the coupled dynamics to the equilibrium and we propose
two different approaches of the problem.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we briefly present standard
EGT main definitions and results. In Section 3 we introduce our evolutionary
game framework that takes into account an individual state dynamics coupled
to the policies ones. A complete characterization of the coupled dynamical
system is performed in section 4, in the particular case of a two states and two
actions game. An analysis of this complete setting is done considering singular
perturbations techniques in subsection 5.1, and another method, based on
rewriting the problem as an equivalent matrix game is described and solved
in subsection 5.2. Finally, the solutions obtained are compared in subsection
5.3 and some applications in network systems are proposed in section 6. Then,
we give in subsection 6.3 a numerical example of our problem, illustrating
the singular perturbation solution and we conclude the paper in section 7 by
proposing some perspectives of our framework.
2 Standard Evolutionary Game Theory
2.1 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
Consider an infinitely large population of players, where individuals are
repeatedly matched at random to play a symmetric normal form game, i.e.
a two players game in which players dispose of the same set of actions and
they have the same fitness function. Let A := {1, . . . ,K} be the finite set of
actions and let ∆ = {p ∈ RK+ |
∑
i∈A pi = 1} be the set of strategies, that are
probability measures over the action space. Note that an action k ∈ A can be
represented through the unit vector ek = (0, . . . , 0k−1, 1, 0k+1, . . . , 0) ∈ ∆, k =
1, . . . ,K. We define by F (p, q) :=
∑
i∈A
∑
j∈A piqjJ(i, j) the expected fitness
of an individual choosing strategy p against an opponent choosing strategy
q, with p, q ∈ ∆. For all actions i, j ∈ A, J(i, j) is the immediate fitness
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obtained by individual playing action i against an individual playing action j.
For symmetric games, Nash equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 1 Strategy q ∈ ∆ is a Nash equilibrium if:
F (q, q) ≥ F (p, q), ∀p ∈ ∆.
If, for p 6= q it holds with strict inequality, q is called a strict Nash equilibrium.
In EGT, the main concept of equilibrium is Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
(ESS), which is a strategy that, if adopted by the whole population, is re-
sistant against mutations of a small fraction of individuals (mutants) in the
population.
Definition 2 Strategy q ∈ ∆ is an ESS if ∀p ∈ ∆, p 6= q, there exists some
εp > 0 such that:
∀ε ∈ (0, εp) F (q, εp+ (1− ε)q) > F (p, εp+ (1− ε)q). (1)
The following proposition allows to characterize an ESS through its stability
properties.
Proposition 1 ([14] Proposition 2.1) Strategy q ∈ ∆ is an ESS if and only
if it satisfies the following conditions:
– Nash Condition: F (q, q) ≥ F (p, q) ∀p ∈ ∆,
– Stability Condition: F (q, q) = F (p, q)⇒ F (q, p) > F (p, p) ∀p 6= q.
It immediately follows that any strict Nash equilibrium is an ESS, while
the converse is not true. Finally, there is the following necessary and sufficient
condition for a strategy q to be an ESS.
Proposition 2 ([15] Theorem 6.4.1) The strategy q ∈ ∆ is an ESS if and
only if:
F (q, p) > F (p, p),
for all p 6= q in some neighborhood of q in ∆.
In population games [16], the notion of evolutionary stability is associated
to the population state, defined by a vector x = (x1, . . . , xK), where xi is the
fraction of individuals in the population playing action i ∈ A (i.e. choosing
strategy ei). Note that, as
∑K
i=1 xi = 1, then x ∈ ∆ and it is formally equiv-
alent to a mixed strategy. If q ∈ ∆ and x ∈ ∆, the expected fitness F (q, x)
of a population game is thus thought of as the average expected fitness of
a group of individuals such that a fraction qi of the group uses pure action
i ∈ A, against a population in state x. When the fitness function F is linear
in the population state, then evolutionarily stable state and ESS coincide: in
the following, we will make no distinction between these two interpretations.
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2.2 Replicator Dynamics
We suppose that players play actions in A. The population profile at time
t is given by a vector x(t) ∈ ∆. The replicator dynamics, first defined in
[16], describes how the distribution of pure actions evolves in time depending
on interactions between individuals. Replicator dynamics of action i ∈ A is
expressed by the following equation:
ẋi(t) = xi(t)(Fi(x(t))− F̄ (x(t))), (2)
where by Fi(x(t)) := F (ei, x(t)) we denote the immediate expected fitness of
an individual playing action i ∈ A in a population in state x(t) and F̄ (x(t)) =∑K
i=1 xi(t)Fi(x(t)) is the average immediate expected fitness of the population.
The replicator equation has numerous properties and there is a close rela-
tionship between its rest points, which are the equilibrium points of the ODE
(2), and the equilibria of a game. The folk theorem of evolutionary game theory
[17] states that:
1. any Nash equilibrium profile is a rest point of the replicator equation;
2. if a Nash equilibrium profile is strict then it’s asymptotically stable;
3. if a rest point is the limit of an interior orbit for t→∞, then it is a Nash
equilibrium profile;
4. any stable rest point of the replicator dynamics is a Nash equilibrium
profile,
where a rest point x∗ is stable if, for every neighborhood Ux∗ of x
∗ there
exists a neighborhood Vx∗ of x
∗ such that x(0) ∈ Vx∗ implies x(t) ∈ Ux∗ ,
∀t ≥ 0; an orbit is interior if it is such that x(t) ∈ int∆ := {x ∈ ∆|xi > 0,∀i =
1, . . . ,K}; x∗ is said to be attracting if it has a neighborhood Ux∗ such that
x(t)→ x∗ for t→∞ holds for ∀x ∈ Ux∗ and it is asymptotically stable if it is
both stable and attracting. Any ESS is an asymptotically stable rest point and
an interior ESS is globally stable, but the converse does not hold in general.
In [15], it is proven that a state x∗ is evolutionarily stable if and only if the
function Γ (x) :=
∏
i x
x∗i
i , with x ∈ ∆ is a strict local Lyapunov function for
the replicator dynamics.
3 Individual States and Policies in Evolutionary Games: a general
model
3.1 The individual state dynamical model
We consider a population game in which each individual is controlled by
a CT-MDP [18]. In this type of controlled Markov process, the action of the
decision maker determines the transition rate of the system. Let S be the finite
state space of each player, with |S| = N and A the finite set of actions, with
|A| = K. Let us first describe the state dynamics and the Markov process
associated to each individual.
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Let Rs(s
′, a) be the transition rate from state s′ to state s given action a,
which satisfies Rs(s
′, a) ≥ 0 for all s′ ∈ S, s′ 6= s, and a ∈ A. These transition
rates are conservative, i.e.∑
s
Rs(s
′, a) = 0, ∀s′ ∈ S,∀a ∈ A.
Also the transition rates are stable, i.e.
sup
a∈A
Rs′(a) <∞, ∀s′ ∈ S.
with Rs′(a) := −Rs′(s′, a) ≥ 0. In our context, the set of actions is finite,
which guarantees the stability of the transition rates. Note that the transition
rate of an individual depends only on the action of the individual, and not of
the others.
Remark 1 In order to establish the relationship between the discrete time
MDP and the CT-MDP, it is possible to consider the discrete time MDP
embedded at transition epochs of each event, as proposed in [18]. But, as we
focus here on the continuous time replicator dynamics, we suppose that each
individual controls his transition rates.
We define a randomized Markov policy as a mapping between state space,
action space and time into the unit interval. For each state s′ ∈ S and time t,
a randomized Markov policy ut(a|s′) determines the probability to play action
a in state s′ at time t. Only one action is used at each time, depending on
the time variable t and the current state s′. Then, for a given state s′ and
time t, a randomized Markov policy ut(.|s′) determines a probability distri-
bution over A. We denote by U the set of all randomized Markov policies.
A randomized Markov policy ut(.|s′) is said to be randomized stationary if
ut(.|s′) = u(.|s′) for each state s′ and time t. We denote by US the set of
all randomized stationary policies. If a randomized stationary policy u(.|s′)
determines, for all state s′, a specific Dirac measure over the action set A, the
policy is said to be deterministic stationary. Finally, we denote by UD the set
of all deterministic stationary policies. In the following, a randomized Markov
policy, a randomized stationary policy and a deterministic stationary policy
are simply referred to respectively as a Markov policy, a stationary policy
and a deterministic policy. By definition, we have the following relationship:
UD ⊂ US ⊂ U.
In standard evolutionary games, each individual plays a strategy, whereas
in our framework, individuals choose a deterministic policy in the finite set
UD = {u1, . . . , uD}. The choice of a policy determines the action played in each
state and also the time spent by each individual in each state. Indeed, for any
state s′ and action a, the sojourn time in state s′ is a random variable which
follows an exponential distribution with parameter Rs′(a) =
∑
s6=s′ Rs(s
′, a).
Then, under a given deterministic policy ul ∈ UD, as there is a unique action
a = uj(s
′) associated to each state s′, i.e. uj(a|s′) = 1, the time spent in any
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state s′ for any individual choosing this policy, follows an exponential distribu-
tion with parameter Rs′(a) = Rs′(uj(s
′)). Then, the fraction of individuals in
a given state depends on the distribution of policies over the population. This
fraction allows to define the reward obtained for each individual at each pair-
wise interaction. For any deterministic policy uj ∈ UD and any state s′ ∈ S,
the average time an individual playing policy uj spends in state s
′ is given
by 1/Rs′(uj(s
′)). Note that general sojourn time distribution can be also con-
sidered, but we keep in the rest of the paper the exponential assumption in
order to obtain closed-form solutions of the equilibrium Markovian policy of
our game.
Assumption 1 Under any deterministic policy, the stochastic process of the
individual states forms an ergodic continuous time Markov chain.
3.2 Population of decision makers
Let us consider a fixed population of M decision makers, where each one
has his own CT-MDP as described before, with S and A respectively the finite
set of states and the finite set of actions. Let ∆ be the set of distributions
over A. We define the fraction of individuals (decision makers) that are in
state s ∈ S at time t as wMs (t) := 1M
∑M
l=1 1{sl(t)=s}, where 1 is the indicator
function, i.e. 1{sl(t)=s} = 1 if the state of player l at time t is s, and it equals
zero otherwise. For each state s, we denote by Y ls (t) the probability that a
given individual is in state s at time t under a deterministic policy u ∈ UD,
i.e. Y ls (t) = Pus0(s
l(t) = s), where s0 is the initial state. Then, from Assumption
1, Pus0 doesn’t depend on the initial state and, when the size of the population
grows to infinity, from the law of large numbers, Y ls (t) can be approximated by
the fraction of individuals in state s at time t, ws(t) = limM→∞w
M
s (t). The
individual state dynamics, thus corresponds to the dynamics of the fraction
of individuals in state s in the global population. We further suppose that
the individual dynamics also depends on the policies and that, for any state
s, there exists a Lipschitz function hs which describes the individual state
dynamics as follows:
ẇs(t) = hs(w(t),q(t)) ∀s ∈ S, (3)
where w(t) = (w1(t) . . . , wN (t)) is the vector of state distribution, i.e. wi(t)
is the fraction of individuals in state i at time t, and q(t) = (q1(t) . . . , qD(t))
is a distribution over the deterministic policies in the population, i.e. qj(t)
corresponds to the fraction of individuals playing a deterministic policy uj ∈
UD at time t, where |UD| = D.
3.3 State Policy Coupled Dynamics
Based on imitation/learning evolutionary process, we assume that the frac-
tion of individuals choosing each deterministic policy is evolving over time as a
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dynamical process. Without specifying any revision protocol, we define the dy-
namics of deterministic policies through a set of Lipschitz continuous functions
G := {g1, . . . , gD}, such that:
q̇j(t) = gj(w(t),q(t)) ∀uj ∈ UD. (4)
Then, the dynamical evolution of states and policies fractions inside the
population is represented by the following system of N +D differential equa-
tions:
(S) :

ẇs1 = hs1(w(t),q(t))
...
ẇsN (t) = hsN (w(t),w(t))
q̇1(t) = g1(w(t),q(t))
...
q̇D(t) = gD(w(t),q(t))
(5)
We refer to system (5) as the State-Policy coupled Dynamics (SPcD). A
rest point of the SPcD is a state-policy distribution pair (w∗,q∗) satisfying:
hs1(w
∗,q∗) = 0
...
hsN (w
∗,q∗) = 0
g1(w
∗,q∗) = 0
...
gD(w
∗,q∗) = 0
In standard evolutionary game theory, an equilibrium is related to the rest
points of the replicator dynamics (see the folk theorem of evolutionary game
theory stated in previous section). In order to investigate this relation in our
setting, we define the fitness function and the equilibria of our game. We denote
by Fi(w,q) the immediate expected fitness of an individual choosing policy
ui ∈ UD in a population whose state is defined by (w,q), and by F̄ (w,q)
the average fitness in such population. Functions F and F̄ are assumed to be
continuous and linear in q.
Definition 3 A state-policy distribution pair (w,q) is an equilibrium for the
state-policy evolutionary game if ∀ui ∈ UD we have that:
Fi(w,q) ≥ Fj(w,q) ∀uj 6= ui, uj ∈ UD.
Note that, as in standard game theory, an equilibrium pair (w,q) satisfies
the indifference principle, i.e. Fi(w,q) = Fj(w,q), for policies that are used
by individuals in the population. Given a distribution vector of policies used,
we denote by supp(q) := {ui ∈ UD|qi > 0}. We now specify the evolution of
the share of individuals qi(t) using deterministic policy ui ∈ UD at time t by
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introducing the policy based replicator dynamics (PbRD). The PbRD is given
by the following equation:
q̇i = gi(w(t),q(t)) := qi(Fi(w,q)− F̄ (w,q)), ∀ui ∈ {u1, . . . , uD}. (6)
We observe that any unused policy ui remains unused for ever as q̇i =
0. This property is specific of the replicator dynamics which are based on
imitations and not on mutations [16]. Considering the PbRD equation, we
obtain the following relationships between rest points of (5) and the equilibria
of the state-policy game.
Proposition 3 A rest point which is the limit of an interior orbit of the SPcD
(S) is an equilibrium profile of the state-policy evolutionary game.
Proof Trivially, if (w∗,q∗) is internal rest point of the SPcD determined by
system (S), then Fi(w,q
∗) = F̄ (w,q∗) ∀ui, and thus the couple (w∗,q∗) sat-
isfies the indifference principle, i.e. ∀ui, uj ∈ UD, Fi(w∗,q∗) = Fj(w∗,q∗) =
F̄ (w∗,q∗), so ξ∗ = (w∗,q∗) is an equilibrium profile profile of the state-policy
evolutionary game.
Remark 2 Note that the converse does not necessarily hold. Any equilibrium
policy distribution q∗ is a rest point of the PbRD, but the corresponding w∗
is not necessarily a rest point of the individual state dynamics.
Proposition 4 Any stable rest point of the SPcD (S) is an equilibrium profile
of the state-policy game.
Proof Suppose that (w∗,q∗) is a stable rest point but not an equilibrium.
There exists a policy ui used in the population, i.e. ui ∈ supp(q∗), such that
Fi(w
∗,q∗) > F̄ (w∗,q∗), and, from the continuity of the fitness function, there
exists a neighborhood U of (w∗,q∗) such that ∀(w,q) ∈ U , with (w,q) 6=
(w∗,q∗), Fi(w,q) > F̄ (w
∗,q∗). This implies that, for this state-policy pair,
the component qi increases exponentially in the PbRD, which contradicts the
stability of (w∗,q∗). This completes the proof.
3.3.1 Two time scales behavior
We assume here that the states and the policies dynamics move with dif-
ferent velocities. The individual state dynamics are supposed to move very
fast compared to the slow updating policies processes. This two time scale as-
sumption, allows us to consider the singular perturbation method [19] to find
the rest points of the system (5).We introduce the parameter ε > 0 and we
rewrite the states and policies system as follows:
εẇs1(t) = hs1(w(t),q(t))
...
εẇsN (t) = hsN (w(t),q(t))
q̇1(t) = g1(p(t),q(t))
...
q̇D(t) = gD(p(t),q(t))
(7)
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The parameter ε is a small positive scalar which serves to represent the
different timescales of the two processes, where the velocity of the state process,
ẇi = hi(w,q)/ε, is fast when ε is small. When ε→ 0 the states dynamics may
rapidly converge to its steady-state and by the singular perturbation theory,
under certain assumption, one can solve the reduced model and find a good
approximation of the solution of the original system (5).
3.4 Continuous Time Markov Decision Evolutionary Game
Another possible technique to solve the problem consists in assuming that
the distribution of the states is stationary and then defining a matrix game
where a player chooses a policy in the set UD instead of an action. By following
the approach presented in [7], where the authors define a Markov Decision
Evolutionary Game (MDEG), we can define here an analogous continuous time
MDEG (CT-MDEG) as follows. We first define the fitness matrix, representing
the fitness of the raw player, depending on the policies chosen:
H =

u1 . . . uj . . . uD
u1 F (u1, u1)
. . . F (u1, uj)
. . . F (u1, uD)
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
ui F (ui, u1)
. . . F (ui, uj)
. . . F (ui, uD)
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
uD F (uD, u1)
. . . F (uD, uj)
. . . F (uD, uD)

, (8)
where F (ui, uj) is the immediate average fitness of an individual playing pure
policy ui against an individual using uj , i, j ∈ x, y, when the distribution over
the individual states is stationary. The fitness of the column player is given by
the transposed matrix HT . Let Rui = [Rs(s
′, ui(s))]s,s′ be the N×N transition
rate matrix (or infinitesimal generator) associated to the deterministic policy
ui ∈ UD, and let π(ui) be the eigenvector satisfying:
π(ui)Rui = 0
The ergodicity Assumption 1 assures the existence of π(ui). Let J(s, a; s
′, a′)
be the immediate fitness that a player gets when it is in state s and plays
action a against an individual in state s′ using action a′. We can thus express
the immediate average fitness F (ui, uj) as:
F (ui, uj) =
∑
s,s′∈S
πs(ui)J(s, ui(s); s
′, uj(s
′))πs′(uj). (9)
where πs(ui) is the time ratio spent in state s under policy ui.
We define the vector of distributions of the pure policies at time t, when the
distributions of the individual states are stationary, δ(t) := (δ1(t), . . . , δD(t)) ∈
[0, 1]D. Let Fi(δ) be the immediate expected fitness of an individual choosing
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policy ui ∈ UD in a population whose policies distributions are given by the
vector δ, and by F̄ (δ) the average fitness in such population. Thus, δ is an
equilibrium for the CT-MDEG if ∀ui ∈ supp(δ) = {ui ∈ UD|δi > 0}, Fi(δ) ≥
Fj(δ), ∀uj 6= ui,∈ supp(δ). The dynamics of the proportion of individuals
adopting pure policy ui ∈ UD (when the distribution of the states is assumed
to be stationary), are given by:
δ̇i(t) = δi(t)
(
Fi(δ(t))− F̄ (δ(t))
)
. (10)
As we proved in the general case, if the distribution of the individual states
is stationary, then any interior and any stable rest point of the replicator
dynamics (10) are equilibria of the CT-MDEG.
Corollary 1 1. If the trajectory of δ(t) converges to an interior rest point
δ∗, then δ∗ is an equilibrium distribution for the CT-MDEG.
2. If the trajectory of δ(t) converges to a stable rest point δ∗, then δ∗ is an
equilibrium distribution for the CT-MDEG.
Proof The proofs of the two corollaries follows the same line of the proofs of
Proposition 3 and Proposition 4.
1. Trivially, if δ∗ is internal rest point, then Fi(δ
∗) = F̄ (δ∗) and thus ∀ui, uj ∈
UD, Fi(δ
∗) = Fj(δ
∗) = F̄ (δ∗), so δ∗ is an equilibrium profile.
2. Suppose that δ∗ is a stable rest point but not an equilibrium. There ex-
ists a policy ui used in the population, i.e. ui ∈ supp(δ∗), such that
Fi(δ
∗) > F̄ (δ∗), and, from the continuity of the fitness function, there ex-
ists a neighborhood U of δ∗ such that δ ∈ U , with δ 6= δ∗, Fi(δ) > F̄ (δ∗).
This implies that, for this state-policy pair, the component δi increases ex-
ponentially, which contradicts the stability of δ∗. This completes the proof.
In the next section, we present a complete analysis and characterization of
the equilibrium policy in the case of two states and two strategies, considering
the coupled dynamical system. We then demonstrate that, if the system under
study can be described in a simple manner, a closed-form solution can be
obtained. Otherwise, singular perturbation based algorithms can be used to
simulate the system given by equations (7).
4 Complete characterization with two states and two strategies
4.1 Individual state and its dynamics
In this section we suppose that each player can be in one of two possible
states, S = {1, 0}; every individual goes through a cycle that starts at state
1 and moves to states 0 after some random time at a rate that depends on
its policy. After some exponentially distributed time it returns to state 1 and
so on. At each pairwise interaction, the set of available actions of a player
depends on its state: in state 1, A1 = {x, y}, whereas in state 0 an individual
can only use y and thus A0 = {0}.
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We consider the set of deterministic policies UD := {ux, uy}. Let ux (resp.
uy) be the deterministic policy which consists in always playing action x (resp.
y) in state 1. In state 0, an individual always plays y. Each player chooses one
deterministic policy and we denote by qx(t) the fraction of individuals in the
population that play the deterministic policy ux at time t. The policy chosen
impacts the fitness of the player interacting with another individual and also
the time he spends in state 1. We define by µi the rate of decay from state 1
to state 0 when using policy ui, i ∈ {x, y}, where µx > µy, and by µ the rate
of change from state 0 to state 1.
As stated in Section 3.2, since the population considered is large, from
the law of large numbers, the individual state dynamics can be approximated
by the population state dynamics. Let w1(t) denote the probability that any
individual is in state 1 at time t. We define the dynamics of w1(t) as follows:
ẇ1(t) = −µxw1(t)qx(t)− µyw1(t)(1− qx(t)) + µ(1− w1(t)). (11)
The first (resp. the second) term on the right side of the equation indicates
that if an individual is in state 1 and chooses policy ux (resp. uy) with proba-
bility qx (resp. 1− qx), he leaves state 1 at a rate µx (resp. µy). The last term
indicates that at a rate µ an individual in state 0 goes to state 1.
4.2 Individual fitness
At each pairwise interaction, the immediate fitness obtained by an individ-
ual depends on his current action and the current action of its opponent, as
represented by the following fitness matrix:
A :=
[x y
x a b
y c d
]
, (12)
where x and y are the available actions and the matrix entry Aij indicates
the fitness respectively of the first (row) player, and the fitness on the second
player is given by the transposed matrix AT . The expected fitness of a player
interacting at time t, depends on the population profile at time t, which is now
expressed by the couple ξ(t) := (w1(t), qx(t)) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1].
We denote by Jx(ξ(t)) (resp. Jy(ξ(t))) the expected fitness of an individ-
ual playing action x (resp. y) against a population whose profile is ξ(t). By
considering payoff matrix (12), we obtain the following expressions:
Jx(ξ(t)) := w1(t)(qx(t)a+ (1− qx(t))b) + (1− w1(t))b,
Jy(ξ(t)) := w1(t)(qx(t)c+ (1− qx(t))d) + (1− w1(t))d.
We can now define the expected fitness of an individual choosing deter-
ministic policy ui ∈ UD at time t, denoted by Fi(ξ(t)), i = x, y. The expected
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fitness Fi(ξ(t)) depends on the population profile ξ(t) and on the individual’s
state and the policy chosen, which determines the action played in each state.
As we are dealing with a large system, from the law of large numbers, we can
assume that the probability that any individual is in state 1 at time t is given
by w1(t), as explained in Section 3.2. Then, an individual choosing policy ux,
will be in state 1 (resp. 0) at time t with probability w1(t) (resp. 1 − w1(t)),
and then he will get an immediate expected fitness Jx(ξ(t)) (resp. Jy(ξ(t))).
Then the average immediate fitness of an individual choosing policy ux at time
t is given by:
Fx(ξ(t)) = w1(t)Jx(ξ(t)) + (1− w1(t))Jy(ξ(t)). (13)
If an individual chooses uy, then in both states he plays pure action y,
which leads to:
Fy(ξ(t)) = w1(t)Jy(ξ(t)) + (1− w1(t))Jy(ξ(t)) = Jy(ξ(t)). (14)
The average expected fitness in the whole population, whose profile at time t
is ξ(t) = (w1(t), qx(t)) is then defined as:
F̄ (ξ(t)) = qx(t)Fx(ξ(t)) + (1− qx(t))Fy(ξ(t)). (15)
In this context, anequilibrium profile is given by the pair ξ∗ = (w∗1 , q
∗
x) such
that ∀ui ∈ supp(q∗), Fi(ξ∗) ≥ Fj(ξ∗), ∀j 6= i, i, j ∈ {x, y}. An equilibrium
profile is thus ξ∗ = (w∗1 , q
∗
x) stable in the sense of robustness against a deviation
of the fraction of individuals playing the deterministic policy ux. In other
words, this definition says that no individuals have an interest to change its
deterministic policy, considering this population profile.
4.3 Policy Based Replicator Dynamics
The PbRD can be rewritten as:
q̇x(t) = g(w1(t), qx(t)) := qx(t)(Fx(ξ(t))− F̄ (ξ(t)))
= qx(t)[Fx(ξ(t))− (qx(t)Fx(ξ(t))− (1− qx(t))Fy(ξ(t))]
= qx(t)(1− qx(t))(Fx(ξ(t))− Fy(ξ(t))).
(16)
We can investigate the dynamics of actions in this framework, where the fitness
is a function of the population profile depending on policies and states. If we
pick one random individual in the population at time t, the probability that
he plays pure action x, denoted by q(t), is given by the product qx(t)w1(t).
By carrying out the expression of q̇x(t), we get the following equation for the
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growth rate of the fraction of individuals playing action x in the population
at time t:
q̇(t) = q̇x(t)w1(t) + qx(t)ẇ1(t) = qx(t)[w1(t)(Fx(ξ(t))− F̄ (ξ(t))) + ẇ1(t)],
=
q(t)
w1(t)
[w1(t)(Fx(ξ(t))− F̄ (ξ(t))) + ẇ1(t)].
We thus obtain:
q̇(t)
q(t)
= (Fx(ξ(t))− F̄ (ξ(t))) +
ẇ1(t)
w1(t)
. (17)
Equation (17) shows how the evolution of states impacts the dynamics of
actions in our context. We observe that the growth rate of action x is increasing
in the growth rate of state 1 and a sufficiently high growth rate of state 1 can
lead to a growing rate of action x even if policy ux is non-optimal.
The SPcD system, which combines the dynamics of the individual state
and the dynamics of the policies used in the population, simplifies to:
(S)
{
ẇ1 = h(ξ(t))
q̇x = g(ξ(t))
where ξ(t) = (w1(t), qx(t)) is the population profile. Functions h and g are
continuously differentiable in ξ, (i.e. the partial derivatives ∂h/∂w1, ∂h/∂qx,
∂g/∂w1, ∂g/∂qx are continuous), and thus they are locally Lipschitz contin-
uous with respect to ξ in the compact space [0, 1]2, which guarantees the
existence of a solution of the system (S). Since in Proposition 3 and Proposi-
tion 4 we established the relation between the rest points of the SPcD and the
equilibria of the state-policy game, in the next section we solve the system (S)
by applying the singular perturbation method.
5 Approximation techniques
In this section we show in details the two approximation tech-
niques briefly introduced in the general case in Section 3, in the
particular case of two states and two actions.
5.1 Singular perturbations approach
As introduced in Section 3, we assume that the state and the policy pro-
cesses move with different velocities. We thus introduce a small parameter
ε > 0, such that:
εẇ1 := h(w1, qx).
We then rewrite the system of the two coupled differential equations as follows:
(Sε)
{
εẇ1 = h(w1, qx),
q̇x = g(w1, qx).
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Considering this two-time scale version (Sε) of the initial system (S), we can
approximate the solution of (S) using the standard Singular Perturbation
Model [19].
When ε → 0, we can consider the quasi-steady-state-model [19] by first
solving in w1 the transcendental equation 0 = h(w1, qx) and then rewriting
the differential equation q̇ as a function of the obtained roots. As the latter
equation has a unique real solution w∗1(qx), our system is in normal form . This
allows us to solve the second differential equation called the quasi-steady-state
equation:
q̇x = g(w
∗
1(qx), qx). (18)
If the Assumption 3.2 defined in [19] is satisfied, the reduced
model is a good approximation of the original system. As defined in
this book, this approximation is good in the sense that a strong sta-
bility property is verified for the reduced system. Particularly, the
trajectory of the approximation system is O(ε) of the initial system,
and hence also for the rest points. This assumption on strict negativ-
ity of eigenvalues real parts simplifies in our case to the following condition:
∂h
∂w1
(w1, qx) < 0. We thus verify that, in our case,
∂h
∂w1
(w1, qx) < 0, which
guarantees that we can apply the singular perturbation method to solve (Sε).
The two-time scale behavior of w1(t) and qx(t) has a geometric interpreta-
tion, as trajectories in R2. If we define the manifold sets Mε := {ϕ s.t. w1 =
ϕ(qx, ε) and ε = h(ϕ(qx, ε), qx)}, it is possible to rewrite the problem in
terms of invariant manifolds. When ε = 0, the manifold M0 corresponds to the
expression of the quasi steady state model. When the condition ∂h∂w1 (w1, qx) <
0 is satisfied, we have that the equilibrium manifold M0 is stable (attractive).
In particular, the existence of a conditionally stable manifold M0 for ε = 0
implies the existence of an invariant manifold Mε satisfying the following con-
vergence for all ε ∈ [0, ε∗]:
ϕ(ε, qx)→ ϕ(0, qx), and Mε →M0 as ε→ 0.
The positive constant ε∗ is determined such that the following manifold con-
dition is satisfied:
ε
∂ϕ
∂x
g(ϕ(qx, ε), qx) = h(ϕ(qx, ε), qx),
for all qx and ε ∈ [0, ε∗]. The attractiveness of the slow manifold M0 is illus-
trated in the numerical illustrations section. Let us now compute the solution
of the approximate system (S0). We thus suppose that the distribution of
the individual states is stationary (expressed by Equation (11)). By impos-
ing ẇ1 = 0, we obtain the following slow manifold M0 := {ϕ s.t. w1 =
ϕ(qx, 0) and 0 = h(qx, ϕ(qx, 0))}:
ϕ(qx, 0) =
µ
µ+ µxqx + µy(1− qx)
:= ϕ1(qx). (19)
The PbRE (16) can now be rewritten as:
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q̇x(t) = qx(t)(1− qx(t)) [Fx(w∗1(qx(t)), qx(t))− Fy(w∗1(qx(t)), qx(t))] . (20)
Proposition 5 For ε sufficiently small, the solution of the system (Sε) can
be approximated by the solution of S0, which is given by the population profile
ξ∗ = (w∗1 , q
∗
x), such that:
w∗1 =
µ− s∗(µx − µy)
µ+ µy
and q∗x =
s∗(µ+ µy)
µ− s∗(µx − µy)
, (21)
where s∗ is the equilibrium of the standard replicator dynamics (2) when con-
sidering payoff matrix (12):
s∗ =
d− b
γ
with γ = a− b− c+ d.
Proof Let us first study the equation q̇x = 0 before substituting the stationary
equation of the state dynamics. Solving this equation is equivalent to finding
the population profile ξ = (w∗1 , qx) such that:
Fx(w
∗
1 , qx) = Fy(w
∗
1 , qx).
By explicitig the expressions of the fitness, after some manipulations we get
the equivalent equation:
w∗1aw
∗
1qx + w
∗
1b(1− w∗1qx) + (1− w∗1)cw∗1qx
+ (1− w∗1)d(1− w∗1qx) = cw∗1qx + d(1− w∗1qx).
(22)
Then, after some algebra, we get:
w∗1qx =
d− b
γ
:= s∗.
The stationary condition of the first differential equation (11) leads the fol-
lowing relation between w1 and qx:
w1 = w
∗
1(qx) =
µ
µ+ µxqx + µy(1− qx)
,
then we have to solve: w∗1(qx)qx = s
∗. This last equation is equivalent to:
µqx
µ+ µxqx + µy(1− qx)
= s∗.
After some simple manipulations we obtain:
qx =
s∗(µ+ µy)
µ− s∗(µx − µy)
:= q∗x.
Finally, as we have that w∗1(q
∗
x) =
s∗
q∗x
which leads to: w∗1 =
µ−s∗(µx−µy)
µ+µy
.
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Note that the rest point q∗x of the PbRE (16) verifies:
q∗xw
∗
1(q
∗
x) = s
∗.
We thus obtain that the probability that any individual picked out randomly
in the population, is playing action x at the equilibrium, is equal to s∗. This
value is the mixed equilibrium of the standard matrix game given by matrix
A. It means that, if we consider a state dependent action (instead of policy )
game, the equilibrium is obtained under conditional probability over the state.
We have the following necessary and sufficient condition under which the
solution obtained is a strict interior point.
Lemma 1 The solution q∗x obtained in proposition (5) is a strict interior point
if and only if:
µ > µx
s∗
1− s∗
.
Proof The solution obtained in Proposition 5 is:
q∗x =
s∗(µ+ µy)
µ− s∗(µx − µy)
.
This solution is a strict interior point if and only if:
0 < q∗x < 1.
First, let’s look at the positivity condition q∗x > 0. This is equivalent to:
0 < q∗x ⇐⇒ µ > s∗(µx − µy).
After some basic algebra, the second condition becomes:
q∗x < 1⇐⇒ µ > µx
s∗
1− s∗
.
We have clearly that for all s∗ ∈]0, 1[, µx and µy:
s∗
1− s∗
µx > s
∗µx > s
∗(µx − µy).
Then if µ > µx
s∗
1−s∗ the solution is a strict interior point, and the converse is
true. This concludes the proof.
Note that this condition does not depend on the rate µy. In the next section,
we present an alternative method based on rewriting our game problem into
a matrix game considering only pure policies.
20 Ilaria Brunetti et al.
5.2 CT-MDEG approach
In alternative to the singular perturbation method, we can define the ma-
trix game presented in Section 3.4. In this two states-two actions game, matrix
H has size 2×2 and we can define the stationary probabilities to be respectively
in states 1 and in state 0 when playing action i ∈ {x, y} as follows:
π1(i) =
1
µi
1
µ +
1
µi
=
µ
µ+ µi
,
π0(i) =
1
µ
1
µ +
1
µi
=
µi
µ+ µi
.
The fitness F (ui, uj) can thus be expressed as:
F (ui, uj) =
∑
s,s′∈S
πs(ui(s))J(ui(s), uj(s
′))πs′(uj(s
′)), ui, uj ∈ {ux, uy}
where J(ui(s), uj(s
′)) is the immediate fitness of a player using action ui(s) ∈
{x, y} against an opponent playing uj(s′) ∈ {x, y}, . If we consider the imme-
diate payoff matrix (12), we obtain:
F (uy, uy) = d,
F (ux, uy) = π1(x)b+ π0(x)d,
F (uy, ux) = π1(x)c+ π0(x)d,
F (ux, ux) = π1(x) [π1(x)a+ π0(x)b] + π0(x) [π1(x)c+ π0(x)d] .
(23)
We can now define the replicator dynamics of the CT-MDEG:
δ̇x(t) = δx(t)(1− δx(t))(F (ux, δx(t))− F (uy, δx(t))
= δx(t)(1− δx(t)) [F (ux, uy)− F (uy, uy) + δx(t)(F (ux, ux)− F (uy, ux)
+F (uy, uy)− F (ux, uy))] .
(24)
where δx(t) is the probability that an individual chooses policy ux at time t.
We obtain the following result.
Proposition 6 If the distribution of the individual states is stationary, the
equilibrium policy of the game can be computed by considering the CT-MDEG,
which leads to the equilibrium:
δ∗x =
s∗
π1(x)
, (25)
under the condition 0 ≤ s∗ ≤ π1(x).
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Proof The equilibrium of the policy game can be computed by imposing the
indifference principle, which leads to:
δ∗x =
F (uy, uy)− F (ux, uy)
F (ux, ux)− F (uy, ux) + F (uy, uy)− F (ux, uy)
.
By substituting the values of the fitnesses (23) into the latter equation and by
carrying out the values of the time ratios π1(x) and π0(x), we get:
δ∗x =
µ(d−b)
µ+µx
µ2a+µµxb+µxµc+µ2xd
(µ+µx)2
+ d− µb+2µxd+µc(µ+µx)
=
µ(d−b)
µ+µx
µ2a+µµxb+µxµc+µ2xd+d(µ+µx)
2−(µ+µx)(µb+2µxd+µc)
(µ+µx)2
.
After some algebra:
δ∗x =
µ(d− b)
µ+ µx
· (µ+ µx)
2
µ2(a+ d− b− c)
=
s∗
π1(x)
.
In order for δ∗x to be an admissible equilibrium, it must satisfy δ
∗
x ∈ [0, 1],
which completes the proof.
5.3 Relation between the equilibria
In section 5.1, we adopted the singular perturbation method, which al-
lows to obtain the equilibrium profile ξ∗ = (w∗1 , q
∗). In section 5.2, we first
assumed that the distribution over the individual states is stationary and we
then rewrote the game as an evolutionary game where players choose pure
policies instead of actions. This approach leads to the equilibrium distribution
δ∗x. We now compare these two equilibria.
Corollary 2 We have the following relation between the equilibria obtained
with the two different approximation techniques of the state-policy game pre-
sented:
w∗1q
∗
x = π1(x)δ
∗
x.
Proof It straightforwardly follows from the proofs of Proposition 5 and Propo-
sition 6, since we obtain respectively that: π1(x)δ
∗
x = s
∗ and w∗1q
∗
x = s
∗.
Remark 3 Note that π1(x) is the conditional stationary probability of an in-
dividual to be in state 1 under policy ux, while w
∗
1 is the probability that an
individual randomly selected in the population whose profile is ξ∗ is in state
1 at the equilibrium, which implies that w∗1 > π1(x). We can mathematically
prove this inequality as:
w∗1 − π1(x) =
µ− s∗(µx − µy)
µ+ µy
− µ
µ+ µx
=
(µx − µy)(µ− s∗(µ+ µx)
(µ+ µx)(µ+ µy)
.
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The denominator is always positive, µx > µy by definition, and, from the proof
of Lemma 1, (1− s∗)µ > s∗µx, so the numerator is also positive. This implies
that the strict inequality w∗1 > π1(x) always holds. We thus have that q
∗
x < δ
∗
x.
We now compare the two equilibria in terms of average fitness obtained by
the population, i.e. F (δ∗x, δ
∗
x) and F̄ (ξ
∗), where ξ∗ = (w∗1 , q
∗
x).
Proposition 7 The average fitness in the population at the two equilibria
obtained with the two approaches are equal, i.e.
F̄ (ξ∗) = F (δ∗x, δ
∗
x) = s
∗c+ (1− s∗)d.
Proof Considering the first approach based on the singular perturbations method,
we have:
F̄ (ξ∗) = q∗xFx(ξ
∗) + (1− q∗x)Fy(ξ∗) = Fy(ξ∗) + q∗x(Fx(ξ∗)− Fy(ξ∗))
At the equilibrium state, we have Fx(ξ
∗) = Fy(ξ
∗) and thus F̄ (ξ∗) = Fx(ξ
∗) =
Fy(ξ
∗) = Jy(ξ
∗). Then, we get the average expected fitness of the population
at the equilibrium with the first approach is:
F̄ (ξ∗) = w∗1(q
∗
xc+ (1− q∗x)d) + (1− w∗1)d.
Since q∗xw
∗
1 = s
∗, then:
F̄ (ξ∗) = s∗c+ (1− s∗)d.
Considering the second method of rewriting the game into a matrix game, we
obtain the following equilibrium profile: δ∗x =
s∗
π1(x)
. The average fitness of the
population in this case is:
F (δ∗x, δ
∗
x) = δ
∗
xF (ux, δ
∗
x)+(1−δ∗x)J(uy, δ∗x) = F (uy, δ∗x)+δ∗x(F (ux, δ∗x)−F (uy, δ∗x)).
At the ESS, we have the following equality F (ux, δ
∗
x) = F (uy, δ
∗
x) and then
the average fitness of the population becomes simply:
F (δ∗x, δ
∗
x) = F (uy, δ
∗
x) = δ
∗
xF (uy, ux) + (1− δ∗x)F (uy, uy).
Then, the average fitness of the population is: F (δ∗x, δ
∗
x) = δ
∗
x(π1(x)c+π0(x)d)+
(1−δ∗x)d. We have that δ∗xπ1(x) = s∗ which leads to: F (δ∗x, δ∗x) = s∗c+(1−s∗)d.
Finally, we prove that the two mixed strategies obtained with the two
approaches are in the same equivalent class in terms of time ratios in individual
states, which means that the time ratio spent in each state is the same for the
two equilibria. Since we are considering large populations of players, we can
think of qx and δx as the probabilities that a player chooses policy ux at the
equilibrium. Then, in the first case, w1(qx) can be interpreted as the time
ratio spent in state 1 by an individual choosing ux with probability qx∗. If
we consider the matrix game and we denote by π̄1(δx) the time ratio that an
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individual playing deterministic policy ux with probability δx spends in state
1, we that:
π̄1(δx) := δxπ1(x) + (1− δx)π1(y) = δx
µ
µ+ µx
+ (1− δx)
µ
µ+ µy
. (26)
In the following proposition we prove that the time ratios in state 1 at the
equilibria, obtained respectively with the singular perturbation technique and
with the matrix approximation technique, are equal.
Proposition 8 The two different equilibria obtained with the two approxima-
tion techniques yield to the same time ratio in state 1, i.e.
π̄1(δ
∗
x) = w1(q
∗
x).
Proof We first rewrite δ∗x as a function of the immediate payoffs {a, b, c, d}:
δ∗x =
(µx + µ)(d− b)
µγ
.
where γ := a− b− c+ d. We substitute it in (26), and we get:
π̄1(δ
∗
x) =
µγ + (µx + µy)
µγ(µ+ µy)
.
Analogously, we substitute the expression of s∗ in q∗x in Proposition 5, and
we obtain:
w1(q
∗
x) =
µγ + (µx + µy)
µγ(µ+ µy)
,
which proves that w1(q
∗
x) = π̄1(δ
∗
x).
Remark 4 The previous results show that, when solving the two approximated
games, we obtain two different equilibrium distributions of pure policies which
yield the same average fitness and the same time ratios.
6 Applications in Network Systems
6.1 Energy Control in Wireless Network
The two-states two-actions model can be applied to describe a particular
case of a problem that arises in dynamic power control in mobile networks,
which has been presented in [12]. The idea of the problem is to consider that
the battery life is a very critical issue in wireless systems, and then, defin-
ing optimal transmission policies based on battery levels is very important.
Moreover, this energy management problem is even more important when in-
teractions occurs between the devices and then complicate the analysis of such
control systems. Then, we consider a system in which the action of each de-
vice impacts the lifetime of his battery or its battery level, and also impacts
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its transmission rate. A large number of mobiles transmit packets occasion-
ally. Each transmitter can be in Full (F ) or Almost empty (A) battery state.
When a mobile is in F state it can choose to transmit packets using high (h)
or low (l) power, whereas if it is in state A, it can only transmit packets using
l power. In general, several mobiles try to join a common receiver at the same
time and interferences occur between the received signals. We suppose that
transmissions are sparse so that the probability that more than two mobiles
transmit simultaneously is negligible. We assume also that a transmission is
successful either if the mobile is the only one transmitting during a slot or if
it transmits at higher power than all the others. Therefore, the fitness of
the player can be obtained by analyzing the number of successful
transmission over the common channel. A closed-form expression of
the fitness is described in [12]. A feedback mechanism, like packet
acknowledgment can be used for each player to compute its fitness.
The time spent in state F depends on the action chosen by the mobile. Then
the state of the mobile changes to the other battery state A. After an expo-
nentially distributed time, its battery state becomes empty. We assume that
the battery is immediately recharged, so that the mobile goes back to state
F . When transmitting at high power, the mobile’s battery is consumed faster,
and thus the transition rate from F to A is faster. Then, considering this
framework, the state space corresponds to S := {A,F}, the action space is
A := {h, l} = AF and the restricted action space for state A is AA := {l}.
The set of deterministic policies UD := {uh, ul} is composed of the policy uh
such that uh(A) = l and uh(F ) = h; and the policy ul such that ul(A) = l
and ul(F ) = l. Then, the system (S) of coupled dynamics describe the time
evolution of the fraction of mobiles in each state A and F , and at the same
time the fraction of mobiles using policy uh and ul. By assuming that the
state dynamic is highly faster than the policy dynamic (the change of policy
has to be reimplemented into the mobiles by manufacturer or designers), then
our analysis describes the equilibrium situation with corresponds to the long
term evolution of this system.
6.2 Network Formation Games
Another application of the proposed model can be found in network for-
mation games [20]. We consider a large number of nodes where each node is in
one of two possible states: Infected or Susceptible, so that S = {I, S}. Nodes
interact through pairwise interactions, during which, both nodes exchange con-
tents. If a node is in state S it determines the type of unidirectional link to
the node he is interacting with. The type of link can be charged at a price
(p) or free (f); if a node is in the infected state (state I), it can only create
free links. Pay connection is safer, so that when a link is not a free one, the
probability for a node to be infected is lower, independently of the choice of
the other node to pay or not and also independent of the state of the other
node. After some random time in I state, a node becomes susceptible again.
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The fitness of a player, a node in this context, should depend on the
evolution of its own state. Then, the fitness is easily computed based
on local information which is known by each player. This application
into networks formation games could ask more assumptions on the model, es-
pecially if the transition rate depends on the state of the opponent. In this
case we should define a more general game framework considering interactive
MDPs, like anonymous sequential games [21]. This generalized framework has
a highly more complicated internal structure. We thus let its analysis as an
extension for future works.
It has to be noted that the singular perturbation approach, proposed in
section V.A is valid for this application, by considering a more complicated
dynamics of individual state, which depends on the action also of the opponent.
6.3 Numerical Illustrations
We illustrate here the theoretical results obtained in previous sections with
numerical solutions and simulations. We consider a first numerical example
with the following transition rates: µ = 10, µx = 1.5 and µy = 1. The fitnesses
of the matrix game are: a = −0.3, c = 0, b = 1 and d = 0.5. Those values yield
to the following equilibrium of the standard evolutionary game s∗ = 58 = 0.625.
We plot on figure 1 the trajectories of the system (Sε) of the coupled differ-
ential equations for different initial conditions and for ε = 0.01. We simulate
a discrete time version of the differential equations. We plot also the invariant
manifold M0 and we observe that it is an attractor of the trajectories.
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Fig. 1 Trajectories of the system (Sε) from different starting points and the slow manifold
M0 with ε = 0.01.
Proposition 5 gives the following solution of the system (S0), by considering
the singular perturbation method based on the steady-state model:
q∗x = 0.7097, and w
∗
1 = 0.8807.
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This couple corresponds exactly to the attractor of the trajectories on figure
1 and then our simulation validates the result of this proposition. The matrix
game approach gives the following equilibrium:
δ∗x =
s∗(µ+ µx)
µ
= 0.71875 > q∗x,
which verifies the Proposition 2. The replicator dynamics equation given by
equation (24) for this matrix game is depicted on figure 2.
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Fig. 2 Convergence of the replicator dynamics equation (24) to the ESS δ∗x = 0.71875
starting from qx(0) = 0.2 and qx(0) = 0.9.
7 Conclusions and perspectives
In this paper, we considered a particular type of evolutionary game in which
the action of an individual not only determines its immediate fitness but it also
impacts the transition rates of its embedded Markov process. The aim of this
paper is to describe the coupled dynamics of the controlled dynamics between
individual states and the dynamics of policies inside the global population of
individuals in pairwise interaction. This latter dynamics is assumed to follow
the well-known replicator dynamics. Once we introduced these combined dy-
namics, we proved that any stable rest point corresponds to an equilibrium
profile of the evolutionary game. We proposed two methods to obtain the rest
points under the assumption that the two dynamics evolve at different veloci-
ties. We gave a complete characterization of the equilibrium profiles for a two
states two actions setting, and we showed that these equilibrium profiles are
comparable in terms of occupation measures and fitness. Finally, we illustrated
our framework with two application scenarios in network systems.
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8 Notation
– A: finite set of pure actions, with |A| = K;
– ∆ := {p ∈ RK+ |
∑
i∈A pi = 1}: set of strategies;
– S: set of states, with |S| = N ;
– U: set of Markov policies;
– US : set of stationary policies;
– UD: set of deterministic policies;
– Rs(s
′, a): transition rate from state s′ ∈ S to state s ∈ S given action a ∈ A;
– πs(ui): time ratio spent in state s under policy ui;
– ws: fraction of individual in the population in state s; w = (w1, . . . , wN ):
distribution over all states in the population;
– qi: fraction of individuals choosing deterministic policy ui;
– ξ = (w1, qx): population profile;
– J(s, a; s′, a′): immediate fitness that a player get when in state s plays
action a in an interaction with an individual in state s′ playing a′;
– F (., .): fitness of an individual
– F̄ (.): average expected fitness of a population
– Fi(.): expected fitness of an individual choosing deterministic policy ui ∈
UD
– Ji(.): expected fitness of an individual playing action i ∈ A
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